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Can Investors Benefit From Using Morningstar’s Stewardship Grades? 
Scott Moore 
John Carroll University 
Gary E. Porter 
Northeastern University 
Interest in governance led Morningstar to develop a summary measure for mutual fund governance. In 
contrast to previous work in this area, we focus on whether and how individual investors can use the 
Stewardship Grade Overall to improve mutual fund selection. We find that regardless of fee structure, top 
overall governance grade funds impose lower costs on investors regardless of fund investment style. We 
also find some evidence that choosing funds with the highest stewardship grade may earn positive risk 
adjusted returns. Stewardship Grade overall may therefore help less sophisticated investors identify 
better-performing mutual funds. 
INTRODUCTION 
Growing sentiment in the investment community that investors should consider fund governance in 
investment decision-making led Morningstar to develop a qualitative measure of governance for mutual 
funds.  Morningstar called the measure the Mutual Fund Stewardship Grade. Fund Stewardship Grades 
follow a school grading scale, ranging from A for funds Morningstar deems well governed to F for funds 
they identify as poorly governed. Morningstar promotes Stewardship Grades as a ready indicator of the 
alignment of interests between fund sponsors and fund shareholders for individual mutual funds. 
Referring to Jack Bogle’s well-known commentary, Morningstar claims that Stewardship Grades can help 
investors discern whether a fund company’s posture toward investors tilts toward salesmanship or 
stewardship.  
Morningstar first released the governance metric for a small number of funds in 2004. Thirteen years 
on, the number of funds Morningstar has assigned Stewardship Grades has expanded significantly, and 
the Stewardship Grade Overall remains one of the few readily available summary metrics investors may 
use to gauge fund governance. As is the case for its fund performance ratings, Morningstar does not 
instruct investors on how to use Stewardship Grades to select mutual funds. Beyond indicating that they 
intend the grades to assist investors in navigating fund selection, Morningstar is decidedly unspecific 
about how to use the metric to improve investment results. Further, while research on Morningstar’s 
measure of fund governance has grown, the extant literature provides investors limited information on 
how investors may apply the grades in decision-making or the specific benefits of doing so. Our goal in 
this paper is to address these issues.  
Considering the perspective of an individual retail investor, we ask how Morningstar’s Stewardship 
Grade Overall may inform mutual fund selection. Like previous studies, we examine whether 
Morningstar’s governance measure relates to returns to a broad sample of actively managed equity mutual 
funds. However, as we argue below, the structure of mutual fund governance may be better suited 
structured to influence the costs investors face in owning mutual funds than in the returns they earn. We 
therefore also focus on Stewardship Grade’s relationship to investor costs – the expense ratio, transactions 
costs, and the fee structures funds impose. These characteristics can substantially influence investment 
outcomes. Further, unlike previous research, we focus on Morningstar’s summary measure of governance 
– the Stewardship Grade Overall. While individual components of the governance metric may be of
significant interest to researchers, the question we address is whether Morningstar’s summary measure of
governance can help identify better performing or lower cost mutual funds. A simple summary measure
of fund governance might be especially useful to retail investors or their advisers. 1
We find strong evidence that mutual fund expense ratios differ across Stewardship Grades. Given the 
long periods over which investors tend to hold mutual funds according to the Investment Company 
Institute, choosing lower cost mutual funds can have a substantial impact on investor results from owning 
mutual funds. An implication of our results is that retail investors who are less inclined to investigate 
technical details of fund fees and expenses may use Stewardship Grades as a simple screen for low cost 
funds. Alternatively, retail investors who rely on financial advisers to make mutual fund 
recommendations may use Stewardship Grades as a means of verifying their advisers are recommending 
efficient options. Either way, investors can weed out high cost mutual funds by selecting among funds 
with high Stewardship Grades Overall. Consistent with previous studies, we find mixed evidence on the 
connection between governance and mutual fund returns. Depending on the measure of risk-adjusted 
return, we find either no evidence of difference in performance across Stewardship Grade, or we find the 
highest rated funds may outperform randomly formed portfolios with similar risk characteristics. We also 
find evidence investors bear different risks in funds with different Stewardship Grades. Finally, we find 
investors or advisers who form portfolios of funds based on Morningstar style characteristics can use 
Stewardship Grades to screen out high expense mutual funds. 
In the sections that follow, we examine the recent fund governance literature as it relates mutual fund 
performance. We then describe our sample and data, our methods, our results, and we review the 
implications of our findings. 
RELATED FUND GOVERNANCE LITERATURE  
The investment community has long recognized the potential for companies that sponsor and manage 
mutual funds to take advantage of fund shareholders by earning inferior returns or charging excessive 
fees. Competition among funds would seem to be the logical first line of defense against this agency 
problem. In a competitive market, investors that experience consistently low returns or high fees would 
shift dollars from weakly managed funds to strong performers. Choice and competition would insure 
survival of the fittest among funds and fund managers. However, Baker, Haslem, and Smith (2009) argue 
that the actively managed segment of the mutual fund industry differentiates its products extensively to 
limit price competition. Other factors such as the complexity of the investment process and tax 
consequences of trading funds may further impede investors from changing funds when performance is 
consistently weak or costs are particularly high. Many retail investors select funds with assistance from 
professional advisers who may limit the menu of funds from which investors choose. Similarly, 
retirement plan sponsors may restrict fund choices for plan participants. Finally, low tax basis investors 
may be reluctant to move to lower cost funds or funds that earn marginally higher returns when realized 
capital gains taxes would more than offset the benefits of switching.  
If barriers to choice inhibit competition and allow poorly managed, poorly performing, or high-cost 
funds to survive, mutual fund governance takes on greater importance.2  Broadly speaking, fund 
governance defines the relationship between investors and the fund management companies that provide 
for the bundle of services that make up a mutual fund. In the U.S., the Investment Company Act of 1940 
provides the legal framework for establishment of mutual funds and sets out the structure of fund 
governance. The 1940 act places a number of potential checks on mutual fund companies to limit the 
potential agency problem between fund companies and fund shareholders. The 1940 act requires mutual 
funds to have boards of directors, and it charges boards with representing fund shareholder interests in the 
management of funds. In principle, mutual fund boards should play a vital role in monitoring fund 
sponsors and investment managers, enforcing limits on their behavior through oversight, contracting, and 
hiring alternative service providers. Other mechanisms commonly associated with corporate governance 
such as the investment manager’s contract, the portfolio manager’s compensation, board and manager 
ownership stake in the fund, and distribution channels through which funds are sold also shape the 
relationship between fund management companies and fund shareholders. These mechanisms may also 
influence fund returns and expenses. 
A key role of a mutual fund’s board is to contract with the mutual fund management company and 
other third parties for the services required to operate the mutual fund. These service costs are a critical 
determinant of the fund expense ratios. The close relationship between mutual fund boards and mutual 
fund sponsors and management companies has led a number of authors to question whether board 
structure may affect fund fees and expenses. Tufano and Sevick (1997) study the relationship between 
board size, director independence, director compensation, and director workload on fund expenses and 
fees. They find that smaller, more independent boards are associated with lower investor costs. Rowe and 
Davidson (2005) and Gemmill and Thomas (2006) find similar results for board size and fees for a 
closed-end mutual funds. Meschke (2007) analyzes open-end fund board structure and expenses for a 
more recent sample period. His results are inconclusive with respect to the importance of the number and 
the proportion of independent directors on a mutual fund’s board. However, Meshke finds that mutual 
funds with independent board chairs tend to have lower overall expenses.  Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge 
(2006) investigate whether the investment manager’s ownership stake in a fund he or she manages 
significantly explains fund expenses. They find an inverse relationship between investment manager 
ownership stake and fund expenses. They conclude that the investment manager’s ownership stake 
provides an incentive alignment effect that improves fund management efficiency. Ferris and Yan (2007) 
find that board independence is insignificant in determining fund expenses. However, Ferris and Yan also 
find board size and director compensation relate statistically significantly to fund expenses. Erzurumlu 
and Kotomin (2016) study whether brokerage and soft dollar practices of mutual funds explain fund 
expenses. They find that funds that use soft dollars are more expensive to own but don’t provide better 
return performance. They also examine the relationship between various board characteristics and 
commissions funds pay for securities trades. They conclude that board characteristics may influence soft-
dollar related agency costs of mutual fund ownership. 
 A growing body of literature also examines the relationship between mutual fund governance 
variables and mutual fund returns. Tuffano and Sevick, and Ding and Wermers, for example, find that 
larger boards - but not the level of board independence - relate to better fund performance. Meschke, in 
contrast finds only weak support for a connection between fund governance variables and fund returns. 
Deli (2002) and Almazan et.al. (2004) examine contracting as a means of controlling mutual fund 
manager discretion to act against the interest of fund shareholders. They find limited evidence that 
contracting explains variation in mutual fund performance. Ding and Wermer’s (2005) working paper 
examines whether investment manager entrenchment or changes in the investment portfolio manager 
relate to fund performance. Their study also considers the relationship between fund returns and various 
board characteristics.  
Several studies consider the relationship between fund governance variables and outcomes related 
indirectly to fund performance. For example, Ding and Wermers (2005) examine the relationship between 
board characteristics and the likelihood of a change in fund investment manager following poor returns. 
Similarly, Fu and Wedge (2011) study departures of the investment managers of equity mutual funds. 
They find that director independence at funds with weak returns increases the chance that investment 
managers will depart. Ding and Wermers also examine whether governance variables predict the 
likelihood a fund is involved in legal or regulatory difficulties. Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (2007) study 
the role of fund governance in explaining the outcomes of mutual fund mergers. Khorana, Wahal, and 
Zenner (2002) consider whether rights offerings by closed-end funds lead to wealth transfers from fund 
shareholders to fund sponsors.  
On balance, the results from the growing body of literature on mutual fund governance suggest 
investors may gain from considering governance in making mutual fund decisions. The results from these 
studies broadly support the proposition that fund governance variables relate to outcomes that matter to 
investors – especially fund expenses.  For retail investors, unfortunately, information on governance 
variables such as board independence, board compensation, the number of funds overseen by board 
members, or the trading commissions in a fund he or she manages is tucked away in unfamiliar reports 
like the Statement of Additional Information. In some cases, construction of the variables that may affect 
fund returns and expenses are complex, and the nature of the link between the governance variables and 
investor outcomes is similarly complex. It is reasonable to ask therefore whether investors – especially 
individual retail investors, or in many cases, their advisers – can reasonably process fund governance 
information effectively or efficiently enough to aid in selecting mutual funds. From this perspective, a 
summary measure of fund governance like the Morningstar Mutual Fund Stewardship Grade Overall 
could be useful to investors.  
To date Morningstar’s Stewardship Grades have enjoyed less popularity as a measure of fund 
governance in empirical studies of mutual fund performance than specific mechanisms of the fund 
governance structure such as the proportion of independent directors on the board. 3 Chou, Ng and Wang 
(2011) examine whether Morningstar Stewardship Grade explains governance characteristics of the 
companies fund managers select into a fund portfolio or fund manager proxy voting records. They 
conclude funds with better governance ratings invest in better-governed companies, but the reasoning 
behind the result is scant. Chen and Huang (2012) examine the relationship between Morningstar 
performance measures and Morningstar Stewardship Grades. They report mixed results, but conclude 
there is evidence that some categories of the Stewardship Grade Overall are related to performance. 
Gottesman and Morey (2012) consider the connection between fund performance and fund culture. They 
find that the grade Morningstar assigns to fund culture fails to explain fund returns. Gottesman and Morey 
also find funds with better Morningstar fund culture ratings tend to have lower fund expense ratios. 
However, surprisingly few studies focus on the relationship between the Stewardship Grade Overall and 
fund expenses.  
Based on our review above, there appears to be merit in examining Morningstar Stewardship Grades 
from the perspective of retail investors who might use the information to select among mutual funds, or 
wish to evaluate their retirement plan fund offerings, or their financial adviser recommendations. Thus, 
this paper focuses specifically on whether and how investors might meaningfully employ Morningstar’s 
Stewardship Grade Overall to better evaluate and choose among the wide assortment of mutual funds 
available, better gauge the offerings of their retirement plans, or better evaluate the judgment of their 
financial advisers. The results presented below help fill this void in the extant literature.  
SAMPLE DATA 
Morningstar covered just 400 mutual funds when it introduced Stewardship Grades in 2004.  Since 
then it has since expanded coverage significantly. Today Morningstar publishes fund Stewardship Grades 
for nearly 10,000 U.S. based and international mutual funds. Morningstar arrives at its overall grade for 
individual fund governance by assessing five fund characteristics, including: 
• Board Quality
• Manager Incentive
• Corporate Culture
• Expenses
• Regulatory Issues
Initially, Morningstar established a numerical score and grade for each characteristic for each fund.4 
They summed individual characteristic scores to determine the Stewardship Grade Overall. Morningstar 
continues to evaluate the five fund governance characteristics listed above, however, the company 
modified the methodology for determining Stewardship Grade Overall. Morningstar no longer reports a 
grade for Regulatory Issues; now Morningstar lists Regulatory Issues as ‘Negative’ if the fund is involved 
in a regulatory dispute and ‘Neutral’ if it is not. The weight Morningstar assigns each component to 
determine the Stewardship Grade Overall has also changed somewhat. Initially the scores were 
approximately equally weighted. Today, Morningstar puts more weight on its grades for Corporate 
Culture and Manager Incentive. Morningstar reports all five individual governance characteristic grades 
for the funds it rates as well as its Stewardship Grades Overall online and in its publications.5 
Stewardship Grade Overall and all other mutual fund data for this study are taken from the December 
2007 Morningstar Principia Plus database. Following much of the previous research which focuses on 
equity mutual funds, our sample selection begins with all non-index mutual funds in the Principia 
database that have an equity style box and no fixed income style box. We then select actively managed 
open-end mutual funds for which Morningstar publishes Stewardship Grades.  We then eliminate funds 
without positive net assets, and funds that have zero or missing net expense ratios. Although each fund 
that passes the screens above has a separate ticker, many of the funds are actually share classes of the 
same fund. For example, Table 1 shows Franklin Templeton offers five share classes – A, B, C, 
Retirement, and Institutional - of its Mutual Discovery fund. Each share class is invested in the same 
underlying fund portfolio according to the fund’s investment objective, but the share classes have 
different minimum investments, front-end or back-end loads, and varying expense ratios. 
TABLE 1 
NET ASSETS INVESTED AND VARIOUS INVESTOR FEES AND EXPENSES BY 
SHARE CLASS OF FRANKLIN TEMPLETON’S MUTUAL DISCOVERY SERIES 
FUNDS 
Net assets are in millions of dollars. The net expense ratio, loads and 12b-1 fee are 
expressed as percentages of net assets. 
Fund Name 
Share 
Class 
Net  
Assets in 
$millions 
Net 
Expense 
Ratio (%) 
Front 
Load 
(%) 
Back 
Load 
(%) 
12b-1 
Fee 
(%) 
Mutual Discovery A A $8,928.50  1.36 5.75 0.00 0.31 
Mutual Discovery B B $276.20  2.05 0.00 4.00 1.00 
Mutual Discovery C C $3,074.50  2.05 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Mutual Discovery R Retirement $276.10  1.55 0.00 0.00 0.50 
Mutual Discovery Z Institutional $4,718.90 1.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total Portfolio Assets $17,274.20  
Table 2 presents summary information on the number and size of all 2,597 equity mutual share 
classes of the funds that meet our sample criteria. We report this information sorted by Morningstar’s 
investment categories in descending order by the aggregate net assets of the funds in each category. The 
number of share classes and the size of the actively managed mutual funds in our sample is highly 
concentrated. Almost 40% of the share classes and almost half of the net assets managed fall in the first 
three Morningstar investment style categories - large growth, large value, and large blend. Table 2 also 
reports the mean size of the share classes in each category and the largest and smallest share class in each 
category. The data indicate that the distributions of assets across the different investment styles are also 
highly skewed, with many small share classes and some very large classes. Table 2 also splits the sample 
according to whether the funds impose sales charges (either front-end or back-end loads or 12b-1 fees) or 
are purely no-load. Overall, share classes that charge sales fees outnumber share classes of funds that do 
not, but total assets in load and pure no-load funds are split about evenly. 
We are particularly interested in the cost of investing in equity mutual funds. Previous studies 
commonly measure investor cost with the net expense ratio. The net expense ratio includes the 
management  
Table 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS – NUMBER AND NET ASSETS OF ALL SHARE CLASSES IN 
THE SAMPLE 
Share classes in the sample must have positive net assets, a Morningstar equity style box value, and 
a Morningstar Stewardship Grade overall. The data are sorted by investment objective category and 
aggregate net assets. Assets are in $ millions. 2,597 share classes meet our criteria in the 
Morningstar Principia database for December 31, 2007. We classify a share class as Load if it has a 
front load, a back-end load, or a 12b-1 fee. 661 of the 2,597 share classes are unique portfolio share 
classes. 
Morningstar Category 
(Investment Objective) 
Total 
Number 
of Share 
Classes 
All Share 
Class Net 
Assets* 
Smallest 
Share 
Class Net 
Assets† 
Largest 
Share 
Class Net 
Assets 
  All Class 
Mean Net 
Assets  
Large Growth 383 742,125.3 0.1 92,196.6 1,937.7 
Large Value 319 613,590.7 0.1 74,763.3 1,923.5 
Large Blend 297 368,804.3 0.1 38,662.5 1,241.8 
World Stock 179 330,937.0 0.1 82,897.5 1,848.8 
Foreign Large Blend 117 266,575.8 0.5 65,036.5 2,278.4 
Mid-Cap Growth 200 152,798.8 0.1 16,905.4 764.0 
Specialty 229 133,468.3 0.1 14,965.4 582.8 
Foreign Large Value 53 120,687.5 2.4 53,426.1 2,277.1 
Moderate Allocation 62 114,132.0 0.4 27,227.2 1,840.8 
Foreign Large Growth 47 93,229.8 0.3 56,765.0 1,983.6 
Mid-Cap Blend 88 83,505.0 0.7 35,230.7 948.9 
Mid-Cap Value 68 66,729.6 0.2 20,398.6 981.3 
Small Blend 98 64,587.3 0.1 6,319.4 659.1 
Diversified Emerging Markets 49 62,011.4 2.2 13,373.1 1,265.5 
Small Growth 151 49,960.2 0.1 8,228.0 330.9 
Foreign Small/Mid Growth 55 28,351.0 0.9 4,965.7 515.5 
Small Value 51 22,949.7 0.1 4,225.6 450.0 
World Allocation 4 21,898.6 381.9 13,041.4 5,474.7 
High Yield Bond 11 16,778.8 100.2 9,718.3 1,525.3 
Europe Stock 32 15,097.0 0.1 5,282.4 471.8 
Foreign Small/Mid Value 18 13,641.1 2.6 5,479.7 757.8 
Pacific/Asia ex-Japan Stock 3 12,682.5 1,758.4 5,555.4 4,227.5 
Latin America Stock 10 11,562.6 12.9 5,831.5 1,156.3 
Conservative Allocation 19 8,922.7 1.3 4,715.9 469.6 
Target-Date 6 7,548.4 27.4 4,859.6 1,258.1 
Convertibles 12 5,239.3 3.6 2,977.4 436.6 
Long-Short 10 3,438.3 6.5 1,098.0 343.8 
Diversified Pacific/Asia 13 2,917.4 0.4 1,148.7 224.4 
Japan Stock 7 2,778.4 4.4 1,654.4 396.9 
Emerging Markets Bond 6 2,414.7 22.3 2,106.0 402.5 
  Totals 2,597 3,439,363.5 
Table 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS – NUMBER AND NET ASSETS OF ALL SHARE CLASSES IN 
THE SAMPLE 
(Continued) 
Morningstar Category 
(Investment Objective) 
Number 
of Load 
Classes  
Load Class 
Net Assets 
Mean 
Load 
Class 
Net 
Assets 
Number  
of  
Pure No-
Load 
Classes 
Pure No-
Load Class 
Net Assets 
Mean 
Net 
Assets 
No-
Load 
Classes 
Large Growth 269 340,381.5 1,265.4 114 401,743.8 3,524.1 
Large Value 232 337,785.7 1,456.0 87 275,805.0 3,170.2 
Large Blend 199 199,372.6 1,001.9 98 169,431.7 1,728.9 
World Stock 136 286,740.9 2,108.4 43 44,196.1 1,027.8 
Foreign Large Blend 85 144,808.5 1,703.6 32 121,767.3 3,805.2 
Mid-Cap Growth 137 62,115.9 453.4 63 90,682.9 1,439.4 
Specialty 144 33,696.5 234.0 85 99,771.8 1,173.8 
Foreign Large Value 36 26,211.3 728.1 17 94,476.2 5,557.4 
Moderate Allocation 38 7,946.4 209.1 24 106,185.6 4,424.4 
Foreign Large Growth 32 9,880.9 308.8 15 83,348.9 5,556.6 
Mid-Cap Blend 55 21,238.5 386.2 33 62,266.5 1,886.9 
Mid-Cap Value 44 25,783.0 586.0 24 40,946.6 1,706.1 
Small Blend 61 22,201.3 364.0 37 42,386.0 1,145.6 
Diverse Emerging Mkts  33 36,271.2 1,099.1 16 25,740.2 1,608.8 
Small Growth 109 16,777.2 153.9 42 33,183.0 790.1 
Foreign Small/Mid Growth 36 9,537.5 264.9 19 18,813.5 990.2 
Small Value 33 7,898.5 239.3 18 15,051.2 836.2 
World Allocation 2 18,430.7 9,215.4 2 3,467.9 1,734.0 
High Yield Bond 8 5,439.7 680.0 3 11,339.1 3,779.7 
Europe Stock 23 5,396.0 234.6 9 9,701.0 1,077.9 
Foreign Small/Mid Value 13 9,170.3 705.4 5 4,470.8 894.2 
Pacific/Asia ex-Japan Stk  . . . 3 12,682.5 4,227.5 
Latin America Stock 6 786.5 131.1 4 10,776.1 2,694.0 
Conservative Allocation 13 749.1 57.6 6 8,173.6 1,362.3 
Target-Date 3 160.5 53.5 3 7,387.9 2,462.6 
Convertibles 10 1,828.9 182.9 2 3,410.4 1,705.2 
Long-Short 7 1,848.3 264.0 3 1,590.0 530.0 
Diversified Pacific/Asia 9 812.1 90.2 4 2,105.3 526.3 
Japan Stock 3 48.3 16.1 4 2,730.1 682.5 
Emerging Markets Bond 4 263.7 65.9 2 2,151.0 1,075.5 
  Totals 1,780 1,633,581.5  817 1,805,782.0 
fee the sponsor charges to cover operating expenses of the fund as well as the 12b-1 fee if applicable. In 
addition, though the trend has been moving away from funds with loads, many investors pay sales 
charges when they enter a fund or when they redeem funds – or both. Trading costs are nother potentially 
important operating cost for mutual funds.  Most investors would have a difficult time determining 
mutual fund trading costs. Mutual funds deduct brokerage commissions from net assets. Though clearly 
pertinent to mutual fund investors, trading costs are not included in net operating expenses. We 
approximate trading costs by the turnover rate, which measures roughly the number of times in a year the 
fund sells and repurchases its entire security portfolio. Higher turnover impacts investors negatively in 
two ways – first by increasing transactions costs and second by increasing realized capital gains for 
taxable investors.  
Table 3 provides additional summary information on the sample broken out according to the fees the 
different share classes charge. The table reports aggregate net assets, the mean share class size, various 
expense ratios, the turnover rate, and the Overall Stewardship Grade converted to a four-point numerical 
scale similar to a GPA. Panels A and B break down the sample according to whether share classes charge 
12b-1 fees. Each panel further breaks down the share classes according to whether they charge front or 
back loads. 852 share classes (about one third of the total) do not charge front or back loads; most of these 
share classes are pure no-load. Among the 1,745 share classes that charge 12b-1 fees most also charge a 
front load or a back load, but very few charge both. Interestingly, as previous researchers report, share 
classes with no 12b-1 fee have lower net expense ratios on average. However, the mean Load Adjusted 
Expense ratio (the sum of the net expense ratio and the loads) is highest for share classes with no 12b-1 
fee but which charge front loads. Excluding expense categories with 3 share classes or less, average 
Stewardship Grades Overall are highest for funds that have no loads. 
To avoid redundancy and potentially understating standard errors in the statistical tests we report 
below, we follow previous researchers’ approach and include only one share class of each mutual fund in 
our results. We include the share class Morningstar designates as the unique portfolio share class for each 
fund.  Morningstar’s designated unique portfolio share class is nearly always the largest share class 
among the funds offered for the given portfolio or fund.6  661 of the 2,597 share classes in our sample are 
unique portfolio funds. These share classes make up $2.60 trillion of the $3.44 trillion in assets invested 
across all 2,597 share classes in our sample. 308 of the share classes charge sales fees and hold $1.092 
trillion in net assets while 353 of the share classes are pure no-load funds and hold $1.508 trillion in net 
assets. 
Table 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS ALL SHARE CLASSES WITH POSITIVE NET ASSETS BY 
SALES CHARGE TYPE:NET ASSETS, FEES, TURNOVER, NET EXPENSES, AND 
STEWARDSHIP GRADE 
Aggregate and mean assets are in millions of U.S. dollars. Expense ratios, 12b-1 fees, and loads 
expressed in percent. Net Expense Ratio includes 12b-1 fees. Unweighted	 means	 include	 all 
category	share	classes. The Load-adjusted Expense Ratio is the sum of the Net Expense Ratio and 
the Front and Back Load. Loads and the Net Expense Ratio may differ across investors. For funds 
with multiple share classes, the turnover ratio is the same for all share classes. We assign each 
fund’s Stewardship Grade Overall an integer point value as follows: A=4, B=3, C=2, D=1, F=0 
and compute the Mean Stewardship Grade in the same way as a GPA. 
Panel A  
No 12b-1 Fees 
No Front Load Front Load 
No Back 
Load Back Load 
No Back 
Load Back Load 
N – Number of Share Classes 817 1 31 3 
Aggregate Net Assets  $1,805,782.0 $396.7 $11,462.5 $832.8 
Mean Share Class Net Assets  $2,210.3 $396.7 $369.8 $277.6 
Mean Net Expense Ratio (%) 0.91 0.92 1.26  0.97  
Mean 12b-1 (%) 
Mean Front Load (%) -  -  5.94  3.83  
Mean Back Load (%) - 0.75 - 1.67
   Load-adjusted Expense Ratio (%) 0.91  1.67 7.20  6.47
Mean Turnover (%) 68.93 91 73 29.33 
Mean Stewardship Grade (4.0 
Scale) 2.07 1 1.71 3 
Panel B 
12b-1 Fees 
No Front Load Front Load 
No Back 
Load Back Load 
No Back 
Load Back Load 
N – Number of Share Classes 427 842 474 2 
Aggregate Net Assets  $237,194.9 $250,071.3 $1,133,432.4 $190.9 
Mean Share Class Net Assets  $555.5 $297.0 $2,391.2 $95.5 
Mean Net Expense Ratio (%) 1.39 1.96 1.27  1.37  
Mean 12b-1 (%) 0.45 0.95 0.31  0.38  
Mean Front Load (%) - -  5.25  2.25  
Mean Back Load (%) - 2.78 - 0.63
		Load-adjusted Expense Ratio (%) 1.39  4.74      6.20 4.25
Mean Turnover (%) 60.40 65.95 70.46 92.5
Mean Stewardship Grade (4.0 
Scale) 2.23 1.82 1.81 1.5 
RESULTS 
To examine how investors might use Stewardship Grade Overall to make better mutual fund 
selections, we begin by sorting our sample share classes by Stewardship Grade and compare expense 
ratios, turnover, and risk-adjusted return performance as measured by Morningstar’s reported Sharpe 
Ratio. Table 4 presents the results. Panel A shows the sample statistics for the Net Expense Ratio by 
Stewardship Grade. Both mean and median net expense ratios climb noticeably as Stewardship Grade 
declines. The differences between average net expenses from A-graded funds to F-graded funds is 62.7 
basis points for the sample funds. Panel B presents the sample statistics for Turnover by Stewardship 
Grade. Once again, portfolio turnover rises markedly as Stewardship Grade falls. Average portfolio 
turnover, which indicates trading intensity and increases investor transactions cost – and potentially taxes 
- is nearly twice as high for F-graded funds as it is for funds with A-grades. Unless funds with poor
Stewardship Grades negotiate remarkably favorable brokerage commissions, trading costs are likely to be
higher for lower Stewardship Grade funds. Panel C shows average Sharpe ratios across the sample by
Stewardship Grade. In the bivariate analysis, the excess returns measured by Sharpe ratio appear to show
less variation across Stewardship Grades than expenses and turnover. The Sharpe ratio results are
consistent with previous studies that suggest a tenuous relationship between fund governance and fund
returns.
TABLE 4 
EXPENSE AND TURNOVER RATIO SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR UNIQUE PORTFOLIO SHARE 
CLASSES BY STEWARDSHIP GRADE 
Panel A - Net Expense Ratio (%) by Stewardship Grade. All funds - N = 661 
Stewardship Grade N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Highest 
Value 
Lowest 
Value 
A 41 0.889 0.860 0.277 1.880 0.460
B 135 0.936 0.940 0.388 2.010 0.210
C 323 1.070 1.010 0.278 2.200 0.080
D 146 1.321 1.250 0.357 2.680 0.550
F 16 1.501 1.535 0.318 1.950 0.900
Panel B – Turnover (%) by Stewardship Grade.  All funds - N = 660 
Stewardship Grade N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Highest 
Value 
Lowest 
Value 
A 41 37.4 32.0 29.7 131.0 4.0
B 135 49.1 40.0 41.3 225.0 0.0
C 322 73.0 61.5 48.5 236.0 0.0
D 146 77.7 57.0 57.4 329.0 5.0
F 16 68.2 64.0 33.2 120.0 17.0
Panel C  -  Morningstar Sharpe Ratios (%) by Stewardship Grade. All funds N = 650 
Stewardship Grade N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Highest 
Value 
Lowest 
Value 
A 41 0.612 0.590 0.368 1.440 0.070
B 133 0.724 0.670 0.453 1.760 -0.260
C 317 0.672 0.650 0.430 1.980 -1.170
D 143 0.659 0.640 0.467 1.590 -0.480
F 16 0.705 0.595 0.435 1.580 0.080
Table 5 presents results of ANOVA analysis of the differences fund performance characteristics by 
Stewardship Grade Overall. The top portion of the table presents the F-test of the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference in net expense ratio for funds with different Stewardship Grades Overall. We reject 
the null hypothesis at the 1% level for the full sample. We also break the full sample into funds that 
charge sales fees – either in the form of front-end or back-end loads or have 12b-1 fees – and true no load 
funds. The F-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal mean net expense ratio by Stewardship Grade 
Overall for both subsamples. Below the F-statistics, Table 5 presents the mean difference comparisons 
between the expense ratios paired by Stewardship Grades. The results indicate that the higher graded 
groups of funds have lower average expense ratios for All Funds at every comparison level except A-
graded less B-graded fund Net Expense Ratio. When we group funds by load and pure no-load - the signs 
of the differences remain as expected, but the statistical significance is concentrated in the differences 
between higher-rated A and B funds and lower-rated D and F funds.  
TABLE 5 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Net Expense Ratio (%) 
Dependent variable is the Net Expense Ratio versus Morningstar Stewardship Grade. Comparisons of 
mean expense ratios by Stewardship Grade. Sales fees include loads and 12b-1 fees. Categories include all 
funds, funds that charge sales fees including funds that charge only a 12b-1 fee, and pure no-load funds 
that charge no sales fee. The number of funds in each category by Morningstar Stewardship Grade are as 
follows: Charges Sales Fees - A: N=10; B: N=47; C: N=136; D: N=91; F: N=11; No Sales Fees - A: 
N=29; B: N=85; C: N=174; D: N=48; F: N=5. For All Funds the sample size for each Stewardship Grade 
is the sum of the category Ns. 
All Funds 
Charges Sales 
Fees 
No Sales 
Fees 
N 661 308 353 
Model F Value 37.17 *** 8.73 *** 21.87 *** 
Stewardship Grades Differences 
Net Expense (%) 
Mean Differences by Stewardship Grade 
A – B -0.047 -0.003 -0.021 
A – C -0.181 *** -0.083 -0.144 ** 
A – D -0.432 *** -0.239 -0.392 *** 
A – F -0.612 *** -0.476 *** -0.419 *** 
B – C -0.134 *** -0.080 -0.123 *** 
B – D -0.385 *** -0.235 *** -0.370 *** 
B – F -0.565 *** -0.473 *** -0.398 *** 
C – D -0.251 *** -0.155 *** -0.248 *** 
C – F -0.431 *** -0.393 *** -0.275
D – F -0.180 -0.238 -0.027 
Mean Square Error 0.1038 0.1062 0.0621 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Table 6 presents ANOVA results that reject the null hypothesis that average turnover is equal across 
funds with different Stewardship Grades Overall for all funds as well as for funds that charge sales 
charges and pure no-load funds. The comparisons-of-means tests here indicate fewer statistically 
significant differences among the Stewardship Grade Overall pairs. The result that turnover for A-graded 
less B-graded funds is insignificant. But the mean turnover rate for A-graded and B-graded funds less C-
graded and D-graded funds is statistically significant. The results are consistent with the proposition that 
funds with lower Stewardship Grades have higher portfolio turnover, imposing higher trading costs and 
possibly capital gains taxes on investors.  
TABLE 6 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Turnover (%) 
Dependent variables is Turnover Ratio versus Morningstar Stewardship Grade. Comparisons of 
mean turnover and alpha by Stewardship Grade. Categories include all funds, funds that charge 
sales fees including funds that charge only a 12b-1 fee, and pure no-load funds that charge no 
sales fee. The number of funds in each category by Morningstar Stewardship Grade are as 
follows: Charges Sales Fees - A: N=10; B: N=47; C: N=136; D: N=91; F: N=11; No Sales Fees - 
A: N=29; B: N=85; C: N=174; D: N=48; F: N=5. For All Funds the sample size for each 
Stewardship Grade is the sum of the category Ns. 
All Funds 
Charges Sales 
Fees 
No Sales 
Fees 
N 660 308 352
Model F Value 11.63 
***    4.08 **   10.94 *** 
Stewardship Grades Differences 
Turnover (%) 
Mean Differences by Stewardship Grade 
A – B -11.72 -19.31 -9.39
A – C -35.62 *** -35.93 * -39.75 *** 
A – D -40.32 *** -41.32 ** -53.59 *** 
A – F -30.78 -49.18 ** -8.90
B – C -23.91 *** -16.62 -30.36 *** 
B – D -28.60 *** -22.00 ** -44.19 *** 
B – F -19.08 -29.87 0.49
C – D -4.69 -5.38 -13.84
C – F 4.83 -13.25 30.85 
D – F 9.52 -7.87 44.67
Mean Square Error 2312.86    7803.98 2548.01 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
We also perform F-tests (not reported hear but available from the authors) for the null hypothesis that 
the mean Morningstar reported Sharpe ratio for the unique portfolio funds is equal across Stewardship 
Grade Overall for all share classes, pure no-load, and load share classes. We fail to reject this hypothesis 
for all share classes and for the two subsamples.  The results indicate no statistically significant difference 
in risk adjusted return as measured by the Sharpe ratio across funds with different grades.  
To explore the possible link between Stewardship Grade Overall and fund return performance further, 
we follow much recent mutual fund research and employ Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model: 
, 
where rit is the excess return of the one-month return on a portfolio of mutual funds and the return on a 1-
month U.S. T-bill for the same month. (Mkt– Rf), SMB, HML, and MOM, are the usual Carhart factors.7   
We calculate portfolio excess returns by subtracting the 1-month T-bill return for each month in our 
it 1 2 3 4( )i i t i t i t i t itr Mkt Rf SMB HML MOM eα β β β β= + ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
sample period from the equally weighted return on the portfolio of share classes with the same 
Stewardship Grade Overall. Table 7 presents OLS estimation results for the Carhart regressions for the 
36-month sample period January 2005 – December 2007. Panel A presents the results for the full sample.
Panels B and C present the results for the pure no-load and load samples respectively. The figures in
parentheses under the Stewardship Grades indicate the number of share classes in each portfolio excess
return calculation. The t-statistics are in parentheses under the parameter estimates. Our primary interest
in Table 7 is in the first column. In Panel A, alpha is positive and statistically significant for the equally
weighted portfolio of all funds with Stewardship Grade Overall of A. While alphas for the remaining
Stewardship Grade Overall
TABLE 7 
CARHART FOUR FACTOR REGRESSION RESULTS 
The estimated equation is . 
The dependent variable is the excess return on equally weighted portfolios of the share classes 
of funds with at least 24 consecutive monthly returns in the sample period January 2005-
December 2007. Monthly mutual fund returns are taken from the Morningstar Principia database. 
The monthly factors are provided by French.  
Stewardship 
Grade Alpha Mkt-Rf SMB HML Mom 
R-
squared 
PANEL A: Equally Weighted Portfolios of All Unique Share Classes by Grade 
A 
(41) 
0.1262 0.9154 0.2178 0.0127 -0.0037 0.986 
(2.06)** (33.85)*** (6.77)*** (0.39) (-0.12)
B 
(135) 
0.1353 0.9737 0.1411 0.1231 0.1343 0.960 
(1.27) (20.66)*** (2.52)** (2.16)** (3.11)*** 
C 
(323) 
0.0862 0.9794 0.1259 0.0046 0.1417 0.972 
(0.96) (24.71)*** (2.67)** (0.10) (3.91)*** 
D 
(145) 
0.0370 1.0012 0.1077 0.0311 0.1668 0.954 
(0.31) (19.26)*** (1.74)* (0.49) (3.51)*** 
F 
(16) 
0.0918 1.0454 0.1599 0.0434 0.1945 0.949 
(0.69) (17.83)*** (2.29)** (0.61) (3.63)*** 
PANEL B: Equally Weighted Portfolios of Unique No-Load Share Classes by Grade 
A 
(30) 
0.1788 0.9334 0.2365 -0.0474 -0.0005 0.985 
(2.71) ** (32.09) *** (6.84) *** (-1.35) (-0.02)
B 
(48) 
0.1418 0.9554 0.1164 0.1324 0.1055 0.962 
(1.41) (21.53) *** (2.21) ** (2.47) ** (2.60) **
C 
(94) 
0.1343 0.9879 0.1321 -0.0122 0.1580 0.967 
(1.35) (22.56) *** (2.54) ** (-0.23) (3.95) ***
D 
(51) 
0.1163 1.0243 0.0667 0.0653 0.2647 0.925 
(0.75) (14.90) *** (0.82) (0.79) (4.21) ***
F 
(11) 
0.1217 1.1057 -0.0648 0.1565 0.2215 0.912 
(0.71) (14.70) *** (-0.72) (1.72) * (3.22) ***
it 1 2 3 4( )i i t i t i t i t itr M kt R f SM B H M L M O M eα β β β β= + ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
itr
portfolios are positive, they are statistically insignificant. Panel B shows the same result for the portfolios 
constructed of pure no-load share classes. Panel C presents the results for the load share classes. Here the 
alphas are insignificant for all of the governance grades. These results are slightly different than indicated 
by Morningstar’s reported Sharpe ratios. The Carhart alpha results suggest mutual funds with the highest 
Stewardship Grade Overall may outperform similarly constructed portfolios in the market; however, this 
appears to be true only for pure-no load mutual funds.  
Table 7 also suggests interesting differences exist in fund portfolio exposures across different 
Stewardship Grades Overall. For example, in each panel, the coefficients on the market factor (Mkt– Rf) 
are all highly significant and close to one, but they also increase as Stewardship Grade Overall declines. 
This indicates lower Stewardship Grade Overall funds may choose, on average, portfolios with greater 
market risk. In addition, the momentum factor coefficient, (MOM), is statistically insignificant for the A-
graded portfolios in each panel, but positive and statistically significant for portfolios formed with funds 
from all other Stewardship Grades. The momentum coefficients also increase as portfolio Stewardship 
Grade Overall worsens. Because turnover increases as Stewardship Grade Overall declines, the 
momentum result could indicate funds with weaker grades “chase” returns. That is, in order to catch up to 
fund benchmarks or rival fund performance (or just more closely track them), fund managers at lower 
Stewardship Grade Overall funds may trade more in stocks whose returns have more than average recent 
momentum. Stewardship Grade Overall may, therefore, be an indicator of the types of portfolio exposures 
facing investors in different mutual funds. 
The results presented above are consistent with the somewhat mixed evidence on the relationship 
between fund governance and fund returns in the literature. A mutual fund board’s limited ability to 
influence directly the investment adviser may explain the inconsistency in this empirical connection. A 
fund board’s key responsibility is to negotiate and approve contracts between the fund and parties that 
provide the fund’s essential services such as investment management and distribution. Thus, a mutual 
fund’s board directly influences the fees the fund pays for investment management, custodial services, 
transfer services, auditing, and so on. The fund ultimately passes these costs on to investors in the form of 
management fees and other charges the fund levies. However, once the contract with the fund investment 
advisor is set, direct responsibility for investment decisions falls to the fund manager. Fund boards are not 
directly responsible for the portfolio returns. The board’s influence on the investment adviser derives 
from its ability to sever the fund’s contract with the mutual fund management company that provides the 
investment adviser. However, as Tufano and Sevick (1997) point out, boards too rarely fire management 
TABLE 7 
CARHART FOUR FACTOR REGRESSION RESULTS 
(Continued) 
PANEL C: Equally Weighted Portfolios of Unique Load Share Classes by Grade 
A 
(11) 
-0.0173 0.8663 0.1668 0.1765 -0.0102 0.947 
(-0.16) (17.82)*** (2.89) *** (3.00) *** (-0.23)
B 
(87) 
0.1236 1.0064 0.1855 0.1061 0.1864 0.952 
(0.99) (18.28) *** (2.83) *** (1.59) (3.70) ***
C 
(180) 
0.0258 0.9687 0.1180 0.0258 0.1211 0.976 
(0.32) (27.18) *** (2.78) *** (0.60) (3.72) *** 
D 
(51) 
-0.0059 0.9888 0.1298 0.0129 0.1139 0.965 
(-0.06) (22.11) *** (2.44) ** (0.24) (2.79) ***
F 
(5) 
0.0783 1.0180 0.2621 -0.0080 0.1823 0.952 
(0.60) (17.55) *** (3.80) *** (-0.11) (3.44) *** 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
companies for this threat to seem credible. This may help explain the limited evidence of a connection 
between measures of fund governance and returns.  
Together, results from Tables 4 through 7 provide evidence that Morningstar captures some of the 
relationship between a number of mutual fund governance variables and fund expenses found in previous 
empirical research. Connections between various governance variables and fund expenses are complex 
and involve data that many fund investors or their advisers might find inconvenient and costly to 
discover.  Analyzing these connections effectively would challenge many retail investors. Stewardship 
Grade Overall, by comparison, may capture multiple individual governance characteristics.  It is 
straightforward to interpret, easily available, and provides meaningful information to investors about fund 
expenses and turnover. It may also provide information about returns and risk. Stewardship Grade Overall 
sorts funds into groups by expense ratio, with A and B graded funds having the lowest average net 
expense ratios and turnover rates. The differences between expenses and turnover are statistically 
significant and appear to be economically meaningful as well.  
This suggests investors can use Stewardship Grades to classify quickly high-cost, high-turnover 
funds. Based on this evidence, eliminating funds with Stewardship Grades of C or below from 
consideration would lead investors to choose among funds that have lower average operating expenses 
and turnover rates. This holds for investors confident in making their own investment decisions as well as 
those sophisticated enough to select no-load, no-12b-1 fee funds. It also holds for investors who lack the 
time, inclination, or background to make their investment decisions.  Such investors may employ 
financial advisers to assist them in their investment decisions and pay for these services through loads and 
12-b1 fees. Our results indicate that even investors who pay sales charges can experience lower operating 
expenses by selecting funds with Stewardship Grade Overall of A or B. Further, investors who limit their 
selection to funds with overall A grades, may be subject to less market and momentum risk. Finally, for 
pure no-load fund investors, A-graded funds may outperform relative other funds with similar risk.
As a matter of practice retail investors commonly construct (and investment advisers commonly 
recommend) fund portfolios based on style and market capitalization characteristics rather than directly 
on Carhart’s model. To get a picture of the cost consequences of categorizing funds and investing by size 
and style, Figures 1 and 2 chart the mean net expense ratio for the pooled sample of load and no-load 
share classes according to Morningstar’s market-cap and growth style categories against Stewardship 
Grade Overall for all 2,595 share classes in our sample.  
Figure 1 
Mean Net Expense Ratio by Size and Stewardship Grade for all 2,597 Share Classes 
Figure 2 
Mean Net Expense Ratio by Style and Stewardship Grade for All 2,597 Share Classes 
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the potential benefit to using Stewardship Grade Overall in allocating funds 
across investment style. Figure 1 shows that expense ratios rise consistently as Stewardship Grade Overall 
declines. Mean net expense ratio also increases moving from Large-cap to Small-cap funds for any 
Stewardship Grade Overall. Figure 2 presents the same information for the pooled sample of load and no-
load funds by governance grade for Value, Blend, and Growth investment styles.  
The pattern is similar to the previous graph as net expense ratio generally increases as governance 
grade declines across the different investment styles, but the differences are most notable moving from A 
and B to the C, D, and F graded funds. While net expenses for A and B graded funds are similar across 
growth categories, the expenses climb moving from Value to Growth in the C, D, and F governance grade 
groups. Growth funds in particular show a pronounced increase in expense ratio as Stewardship Grade 
Overall declines.  
A remaining issue for investors is whether screening out lower Stewardship Grade Overall funds 
restricts their opportunity set. The analysis above indicates strongly that investors benefit when investing 
by market capitalization or by growth style if they restrict themselves to funds with A and B Stewardship 
Grades Overall. Table 8 breaks our sample of 2,597 share classes down by both market-cap and growth 
following Morningstar’s familiar 9-cell style box. For each market-cap and growth combination, Table 8 
reports the number of pure no-load and load share classes available to investors for each Stewardship 
Grade Overall. It breaks down the mean net expense ratio similarly. Table shows there are eleven Large-
Cap Value funds with Stewardship Grade Overall of A.  The five A-graded Large-cap Value pure no-load 
share classes have an average net expense ratio of 0.79%.  The six A-graded Large-cap Value load share 
classes have average net expense ratio of 1.50%. Interestingly, the difference between mean load and 
mean no-load fund expense ratios for share classes with the same Stewardship Grade Overall is generally 
greater than the difference between the mean net expense ratios of the highest and lowest Stewardship 
Grade Overall funds. This holds for both load and pure no-load funds. Clearly retail investors who do not 
require, or do not receive, services higher expense ratios and sales fees cover should not invest in load 
funds. Regardless of load or investment style, the statistics in Table 8 bear our indications from our 
previous analysis: investors generally face lower expense ratios if they choose higher Stewardship Grade 
Overall funds. There appears to be a sufficient number of funds to offer investors, investment advisers, 
and retirement plan administrators robust choice even if they limit themselves to the top two Stewardship 
Grades Overall.  
TABLE 8 
DISTRIBUTION OF SHARE CLASSES BY STEWARDSHIP GRADE OVERALL, 
INVESTMENT STYLE, AND SALES CHARGE CHARACTERISTICS 
Number of share classes and mean net expense ratios stratified by the Morningstar style categories and 
Stewardship Grade overall for Pure no-load and load share classes.  Pure no-load share classes do not 
charge any sales fees, including 12-b1, front or back-end loads.  Our full sample of 2,597 share classes 
includes 817 pure no-load share classes and 1,780 load share classes. Expense ratios are in percent of 
net assets.   
Pure No-Load Share Classes Load Share Classes 
Value Blend Growth Value Blend Growth 
Large
-Cap N 
Exp. 
Ratio   
( %) N 
Exp. 
Ratio   
( %) N 
Exp. 
Ratio   
( %) N 
Exp.R
atio    
( %) N 
Exp. 
Ratio   
( %) N 
Exp. 
Ratio    
( %) 
A 5 0.79 7 0.74 17 0.68 6 1.50 8 1.36 8 1.28 
B 18 0.70 59 0.66 37 0.77 29 1.45 127 1.25 70 1.36 
C 56 0.84 95 0.88 119 0.88 154 1.49 214 1.56 232 1.59 
D 24 0.99 35 1.01 58 1.06 79 1.69 96 1.79 146 1.80 
F 1 0.99 3 1.23 3 1.21    -         -   16 1.87 12 1.95 
Mid-
Cap Value Blend Growth Value Blend Growth 
A 1 0.92 3 0.77 3 0.81       -  -  6 1.36 7 1.23 
B 3 0.72 10 0.91 21 0.85 4 1.42 12 1.60 43 1.60 
C 18 0.96 34 0.95 55 0.96 28 1.61 74 1.69 109 1.71 
D 7 1.19 5 1.14 24 1.15 17 1.89 16 1.88 53 1.68 
F  -         -  -     -  4 1.35    -  -    -      -  21 2.15 
Small
-Cap Value Blend Growth Value Blend Growth 
A 1 1.01 9 1.02 1 0.82 2 1.78 12 1.61    -  -  
B 1 1.37 5 1.11 11 1.09   13 1.78 21 1.67 
C 10 1.07 10 0.91 20 1.06 18 1.69 19 1.59 52 1.75 
D 5 1.09 9 1.09 9 1.11 11 1.82 15 1.87 21 1.90 
F  -         -  -     -  1 1.30    -  -    -      -  9 2.10 
CONCLUSIONS 
Morningstar began publishing Mutual Fund Stewardship Grades in 2004. Stewardship Grade 
represents Morningstar’s assessment of the quality of individual mutual fund governance. Morningstar 
bases Stewardship grades on variables that previous studies find useful in predicting some mutual fund 
outcomes – especially expense related outcomes. We examine a sample of 2,597 share classes of actively 
managed equity funds. Analyzing expense related metrics such as the net expense and turnover ratios, we 
find that funds with better Stewardship Grades impose lower costs on investors, regardless of Morningstar 
style characteristics. This result offers investors, retail investment advisers, and retirement plan 
administrators robust alternatives even when limiting themselves to the top two Stewardship Grades 
Overall, A and B. The results hold whether the funds charge loads or not.  
Even relatively self-reliant retail investors may have difficulty assessing the overall impact of the 
range of factors that determine the total cost of owning mutual funds. Results from this paper suggest that 
retail investors may find Stewardship Grade Overall a useful and efficient means of screening out funds 
that impose excessive cost. Evidence regarding a relationship between Steward Grades Overall and 
performance is mixed. Results from our examination of Sharpe ratios are consistent with previous studies 
that suggest no connection between fund governance and fund returns. However, results from our analysis 
of Carhart alphas suggest mutual funds with the highest Stewardship Grade Overall may outperform 
similarly constructed portfolios in the market, though this result appears to be present only for pure-no 
load mutual funds.  
While Morningstar claims investors can use Stewardship Grades to improve mutual fund selection, 
the company provides little guidance to fund investors about how to use the metric to improve fund 
selection. We find that Stewardship Grade Overall may capture multiple individual governance 
characteristics, is straightforward to interpret, available to the investing public, and appears to provide 
meaningful information to investors about fund expenses and turnover. It may also provide information 
about returns and risk. Our results suggest that investors who pay financial advisers for their services 
through loads or 12b-1 fees may also find Stewardship Grades helpful in insuring that their advisers are 
acting in their best interests. Alternatively, the evidence presented here suggests conscientious retail 
investment advisers should steer their clients to funds with A and B Stewardship Grades.  
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ENDNOTES 
1. Duffy (2004), for example argues that financial advisors should incorporate governance metrics in developing
investment selection criteria. Haslem (2013) argues that investors can benefit from identifying “stewardship
funds” and Stewardship Grades may be a useful way of identifying “stewardship funds,” or funds with stronger
orientation toward shareholders, which may be subject to less agency risks.
2. Some critics argue that taken together investors are constrained in mutual fund choice to the degree that the
fund industry is virtually devoid of price competition. Data provided by the Investment Company Institute (ICI)
provides some support for this view. According to ICI the average retail investor holds a fund for five years and
stays with same investment company for seven years. Further, research by James and Karceski (2006) suggests
institutional investors who are less constrained by fund menus and tax considerations than retail investors earn
better returns than retail investors holding the same funds.
3. In a working paper, Wellman and Zhou (2005) find that among the initial group of equity mutual funds for
which Morningstar reported grades in 2004, higher Stewardship Grade funds provide better return
characteristics than lower Stewardship Grade funds. They also find evidence following the initial assignment of
grades that money flowed into funds with high marks and out of funds with low marks.
4. For further details on how Morningstar initially set Fund Stewardship Grades its evaluation process see  Fact
Sheet: The Morningstar Stewardship Grade for Funds,
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/DataDefs/FidGradeMethodology.pdf. For further details on the firm’s current
approach, see  Stewardship Grade for Mutual Fund Firms Methodology:
https://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/MethodologyDocuments/MethodologyPapers/StewardshipGra
deMutualFundFirmsMethodology.pdf.
5. In 2011, Morningstar shifted from evaluating governance for individual mutual funds to evaluating governance
for the companies that manage the funds.  Since then all mutual funds from the same management company
have the same Stewardship Grades.
6. For the Mutual Discovery Series fund in Table 1, Morningstar designates the A share class as the unique
portfolio fund.
7. The monthly factors for our sample period were generously provided by Ken French from his web site.
